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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Para. 12. N. J. Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes and
Assessment of N. J., 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111. Decided
Jan. 15, 1930.
Although a state may tax property used entirely in ifiterstate
commerce, it may not burden such commerce by taxing gross earnings
derived therefrom by imposing a license fee for the privilege of
carrying on such commerce.1 A direct tax on gross receipts derived
from interstate commerce is not a tax on property, and is therefore
void.2 If the gross earnings are not taxed, but are used merely to
ascertain value the tax is legitimate.3 The dissenting opinion in the
case is founded upon the theory that the fixing of a price for the
privilege of using something to which the state's consent is essential
is within the constitutional power of the state.4 Even interstate
commerce must pay its way.5 It is submitted that the Supreme
Court should have given greater weight to the right of the state to
tax the privilege which it had granted.
W. S.
INCOME-DEDUCTIONS - OBSOLESCENCE- GOOD WILI.-The
plaintiff brought this action to recover taxes alleged to have been
illegally exacted from it. The defendant, Collector of Internal Reve-
nue, refused to allow plaintiff's claim for a deduction from its income,
for the obsolescence of its good will due to the imminence of Prohibi-
tion Legislation. The plaintiff contended that its good will was such
property as was meant by Section 234 (a), Subdivision 7 of Revenue
Act of 1912 (Act of Feb. 24, 1919) C 18; 40 Stat. 1057, 1078,
allowing as deductions, inter alia, a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence. The collector
disallowed the claim on the ground that the obsolescence intended by
Section 234 (a), Subdivision 7 of Revenue Act of 1918 could only
apply to obsolescence of property used in the trade or business as was
subject to exhaustion, wear and tear, and therefore could not include
good will or obsolescence of the good will. Held, that a deduction
for obsolescence of good will of a brewery due to the imminence of
national prohibition legislation is not allowable under Section 234 (a),
1 Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 338, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366, 368
(1922), and cases cited therein; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 171, 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 62 A. L. R. 45 1928).
'U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211
(1912),; Pullman v. Richardson, supra Note 1; U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,
247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 748 (1918).
' Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373
(1917).
'Per Holmes, J.
'Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.
265 (1918).
TAX COMMENT
Subdivision 7 of the Revenue Act of 1918. Haberle Crystal Spring
Brewing Co. v. Clark, 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. -. Decided
Jan. 27, 1930.
Good will,' although property, is not such property as can be
segregated from the capital assets and has no existence except as an
incident of a going business. 2 This intangible property,3 not being
subject to depreciation, cannot be classed with other intangibles as
patents, copyrights, licenses and franchises, 4 and is not an assignable
asset apart from the business. Upon the sale of a business the price
received would reflect the loss or gain of good will and any such loss
would be a basis for a deduction under the statute 234a.5 The sec-
tion ( under which the plaintiff claims the deduction has been con-
strued to refer to the obsolescence only of property used in trade or
business as is subject to exhaustion, wear and tear. 7
The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the collector,
held that when a business is extinguished as noxious under the Con-
stitution the owners cannot demand a partial compensation from the
government in the form of an abatement of taxes otherwise due.
Further the Court held that obsolescence as intended by Congress in
the Revenue Act of 1918 was not meant to include extinguishment
of business, caused by operation of law.
E.S.
INcomE-RESIDUARY LEGATEES-ACCRETION IN VALUE OF
LEGACIE.-The father of the petitioner died testate, May 20, 1918.
Under a final decree of the Surrogate's Court entered on April 19,
1920 certain stocks were distributed to the petitioner as one of the
residuary legatees. He sold some of the stocks in 1920, 1921 and
1922. In computing the amount of his income tax, he used as a
basis for arriving at the profit or loss on each sale, the selling price
1 "Goodwill is the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establish-
ment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement
which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local
position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality,
or from other accidental circumstances or necessity or even from ancient par-
tialities or prejudices." Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149
U. S. 436, 446.
2Joseph Garneau Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 B. T.
A. 1041 (1927) ; Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 239 Pa. 42, 86 Atl. 634 (1913).
' "Goodwill is property of an intangible nature and the term property
includes goodwill." Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., supra Note 1.
'Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. (2nd) 626 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926).
'Supra Note 4, supra Note 2.
'Rev. Act of 1918, Sec. 234a, Subd. 7 (Act of Feb. 25, 1919). C18, 40
Stat. 1057, 1078.
'Supra Note 4.
